Much theory and research on emotion are based on the facial expressions of amateurs asked to pose for still photographs. The theory of facial affect programs (FAPs; P. Ekman, 1972) was proposed to account for the resulting expressions, most of which are patterns consisting of distinguishable parts. In the present study, 4 Hollywood films noted for fine acting and realism were examined for the facial expressions that accompany a basic emotion. In keeping with the theory of FAPs, professional actors judged as happy were found smiling in 97% (Duchenne smiling in 74%) of cases. In contrast, actors judged as surprised, afraid, angry, disgusted, or sad rarely showed the predicted pattern (found in 0 to 31% of cases). Typically, they used one or two parts from the full pattern. If these films represent real life, these findings favor a theory that assumes separable parts (e.g., components theory) over the older theory of FAPs.
wrote, * The conduct of our affairs is heavily determined by how we interpret the thoughts and feelings of others. ... By watching the faces of others in action, we can to some extent know how they feel. . . . Even if the expression is modified or disguised, there will be telltale signs" (pp. vii-viii) .
Specific facial patterns have been theorized to be biologically hardwired signals that allow one person to know the emotion of another. Izard (1971) , Friesen (1975, 1976) , and Matsumoto and Ekman (1988) have published now familiar portraits of the facial expressions they hypothesize occur for happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness (the socalled basic emotions). An example of the kind of pattern hypothesized is shown in Figure 1 . Shown such expressions, observers from New York to New Guinea, including members of a nearly Stone Age culture, were claimed to recognize the emotions expressed (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971) . According to Ekman (1980) , it therefore follows that "when someone feels an emotion and is not trying to disguise it, his or her face appears the same no matter who that person is or where he or she comes from" (p. 7).
But does this inference follow? Do the recognition studies James M. Carroll and James A. Russell, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
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(even assuming they are valid) tell us what facial expressions actually occur in New "Vbrk, in New Guinea, or in other scenes from everyday life? Most of the recognition studies were conducted with highly artificial materials. Often the facial stimuli were still photographs of amateurs asked to portray single emotions for the camera. In these experiments, the process whereby one person expresses emotion to another was guided by the experimenter to a degree that raises questions of generalizability to the nonexperimental world. To be sure, artificial procedures and materials have their place. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily tell us what occurs in ordinary life.
A more ecological perspective on facial expressions raises the following kinds of unanswered questions:
1. What is the natural response of observers to the facial expressions of others? How often do they interpret facial expressions in terms of single, basic emotions? What other interpretations of facial expressions are made? In everyday circumstances, might the woman of Figure 1 be thought frustrated, overwrought, or histrionic rather than simply angry? 2. What facial behaviors actually occur in everyday life, in what intensities, durations, configurations, and frequencies? For example, how often do the specific facial configurations portrayed by Izard, Ekman, and their colleagues actually occur? Their research and theorizing are largely limited to a small number of facial configurations relative to all possible combinations of muscle contractions of which the face is capable. Which configurations actually occur under various emotion-eliciting circumstances? When one person does attribute a single basic emotion to another, what facial information, if any, was that attribution typically based on? For example, in all the occasions in which Debbie is seen by her friends as angry, how often does her face look like that shown in Figure 1 ?
In this article, we begin to explore the second set of questions. We offer evidence that everyday life might be rather different from what is implied by Izard's (1971) and Ekman's (1972 Ekman's ( , 1975 accounts. When observers attribute happiness to Debbie, she is very likely smiling. On the other hand, when observers attribute anger, surprise, fear, disgust, or sadness to her, she is unlikely to be displaying the specific facial expression commonly studied by psychologists.
Facial Affect Program Versus Components
One characteristic trait of the still facial images provided by Ekman and his colleagues is that they show patterns. The typical facial expression they identified and used in most recognition studies is the result of different muscles acting simultaneously to move the brows, eyelids, cheeks, and mouth. Apparently on the basis of seminal work by Hjortsjo (1969) , Ekman and Friesen (1978) developed a system of analyzing a facial display into its constituent movements, called action units (AUs) . To illustrate, Figure 2 shows how the facial pattern of Figure 1 can be decomposed into three different AUs: AU 5 (raising the upper eyelids), AU 23 (pursing the lips), and AU 4 (furrowing the brow). Patterns are consistent with Ekman's (1972) theory that each emotion involves a "facial affect program" (p. 216), which organizes the full facial response pattern. In this article, we suggest that the predicted patterns-the simultaneous occurrence of constituent facial AUs-are more the exception than the rule.
Recognition studies of facial expression have been largely limited to a set of 7 (±2) prototypical facial patterns and minor variants on them. At the same time, Ekman (1972) and Izard (1994) acknowledged that each emotion is associated with more than one facial pattern. Indeed, Ekman and Friesen (1978, on a specific occasion determines which one of the 6 actually occurs?) Furthermore, facial expressions outside the predicted set of 55 also may occur. If so, Ekman and Friesen's (1978) analysis may not specify the full set of patterns that an observer will recognize (if recognize is the right word) for a particular emotion. It is not clear what interpretations lay observers make and what interpretations scientists should make to any additional patterns. Nonetheless, Ekman (1980) was clear that all the patterns for a given emotion should be quite similar.' There is an alternative account of facial behavior that does not predict one specific facial pattern for each emotion and thus can explain the existence of multiple patterns. Indeed, it raises the possibility of even more diversity, including the frequent occurrence of no facial action, single AUs, and small combinations. This alternative, called components theory, was proposed at first tentatively and more recently with more assurance (Frijda, 1986; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 1997; Scherer, 1984; Smith, 1989; Smith & Scott, 1997) . Imagine that each emotion is associated with dissociable component processes, including cognitive appraisals of the event eliciting the emotion and preparations for actions in response to that event. Hypothesized components include attention to the eliciting event, concentration, registration of novelty or uncertainty, preparation for sudden action, switching from one action sequence to another, staring, and the beginning of various instrumental acts. No one component is common to all instances of any one type of emotion, and each component can occur independent of any other and in the absence of any emotional feelings. All facial movements are the direct outcomes of these component processes. An emotion is therefore expressed in the face only indirectly, through its correlation with the components. Patterns of facial AUs arise only secondarily, through the coincidental co-occurrence of two or more different components. Put more formally, components are necessary and sufficient for facial action; emotions are neither necessary nor sufficient for facial action.
To illustrate, return to Figure 2 . Component theory says that each AU is due to a component. In A, the woman is staring, which results in a raising of her upper eyelids (AU 5); in B, she is bracing herself for sudden action, which results in her Figure 1 . A facial expression of anger hypothesized by Ekman and Friesen (1978, Table 11-1). pursing her lips (AU 23); and in C, she is concentrating on something uncertain or unpleasant, which results in a furrowed brow (AU 4). Staring, bracing for action, and concentrationeven in the absence of any feelings of anger-would still produce the same facial behavior. A feeling of anger, unaccompanied by any components, would produce no facial behavior at all. Of course, these are just hypotheses to illustrate component theory. The details remain to be established empirically.
Although components theory is too new to have answers yet, having an alternative theory does expose questions. For example, to our knowledge, there is no evidence that emotions (as opposed to constituent or accompanying components) actually cause facial movements; no evidence as to just which patterns will, and which will not, be recognized as expressing each emotion; and no evidence on observers' responses to other patterns. Very little evidence is available on the ecological questions we raised earlier: Which facial expressions actually occur? Are they patterns or single AUs? Which specific expressions occur under various emotion-eliciting circumstances? Which expressions are typically available to observers when they attribute an emotion to another?
temandez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda (1997) reviewed the handful of studies of adults' spontaneous facial behavior while experiencing a specific basic emotion. Most such studies overlook the expresser's actual behavior and focus instead on observers' judgments made on the basis of that behavior (e.g., guessing which of two films or slides the expresser was shown). Those studies that recorded and analyzed actual facial behavior used questionable methods and analyses, but several observations emerged. Four expressions have been observed in fair numbers, two "facial expressions of happiness" (either a simple smile or a Duchenne smile) and two "facial expressions of disgust" (either nose wrinkling or raising the upper lip). The participants in these studies reported feeling many other emotions, but apparently the predicted facial patterns rarely occurred (Ekman, Davidson, Friesen, 1990; Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994) .
One point not emphasized in the reports of these studies is that 3 of the 4 facial expressions that have been observed (the simple smile, the nose wrinkle, and the raising of the upper lip) were single AUs. Curiously, these 3 are the only expressions (out of 55 variants) that consist of a single AU (AUs 12, 9, and 10, respectively). The other 52 are patterns. The only pattern reported is a particular kind of smile, called the Duchenne smile, consisting of AU 6 (a wrinkling of the outer corners of the eye caused by action of the obicularis oculi) and AU 12 (the upward and outward movement of the cheeks, commonly called a smile, caused by the action of the zygomatic major). Gosselin, Kirouac, and Dore In the typical study of facial expressions, a facial expression is presented to observers, and the question is what emotion the observer attributes to the expresser. A recent study turned this question around, asking, when observers attribute a specific basic emotion to an expresser, what is the expresser's facial behavior? Gosselin, Kirouac, and Dore (1995) analyzed 513 videotaped episodes in which students of an acting school successfully portrayed one of six emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness), (Verbal ratings by the specific actor involved and by an audience of observers verified this precondition.) The actor had been given a scenario to enact and was requested to convey one specific emotion but was not told how to do so, which facial actions to use, or even that facial action was the focus of the research. Voice, whole body movements, posture, and gestures thus also figured in the portrayals. Performances lasted an average of 90 s and were videotaped in their entirety. The experimenters examined all cases in which a single emotion was successfully conveyed to the audience: They did not select cases of facial behavior to fit a preconceived theory. Gosselin et al. (1995) analyzed the facial behavior of the actors in l-3-s windows surrounding the moment when the emotion was judged as maximal. Their analysis focused on single AUs rather than patterns. A predicted AU was any AU listed by Ekman and Friesen (1978, Table 11-1) within any facial expression predicted for that emotion; a nonpredicted AU was one not so listed. Because their results represent the occurrence of single AUs, not the predicted patterns, they are equally consistent with the facial affect program theory and with the components theory. The results were fascinating nonetheless.
The most striking result was a difference between happiness and all the other emotions. In the portrayals of happiness, the probability of occurrence for a predicted AU averaged .84 and .93. (The first figure was obtained when actors used technique acting, and the second was obtained when actors used method acting.) 2 In the portrayals of the other five emotions, in contrast, the probability of occurrence of a predicted AU averaged from .07 to .36 (depending on the kind of acting and emotion portrayed). Gosselin (personal communication, January 18, 1996) found that the probability of at least one of the expressions predicted by Ekman and Friesen (1978 , Table 11 -1) for a given emotion also varied with the emotion. In the portrayal of happiness, the probability of a predicted expression was .69 and .91 (for technique and method acting, respectively). For disgust, the figures were .41 and .27. For surprise, the figures were .38 and .63. For fear, anger, and sadness, the figures ranged from .03 to. 12. Gosselin et al.'s (1995) results stand as a troubling challenge to the standard Tbmkins-Ekman-Izard account, or at least to the Ekman-Friesen version of that account. If one assumes that dynamic portrayals made by acting students are more realistic than the posed still shots of amateurs, then Gosselin et al.'s (1995) results suggest a quite different picture of emotion communication. When observers judge another to be happy, they are likely to have seen a smile, either simple or Duchenne, on the face of the other. However, when the observers judge the other to be surprised, afraid, angry, sad, or disgusted, a facial expression predicted by Ekman and Friesen (1978) is less likely or even unlikely to have been seen.
2 Technique acting refers to a style in which facial, vocal, gestural, and other expressions are deliberately and consciously practiced by the actor. Method acting refers to a style in which the actor uses remembered emotional experiences to re-create an actual emotion. The outward expression of the emotion then flows naturally rather than deliberately or consciously.
Overview of Present Study
In the present study, we asked the same question posed by Gosselin et al. (1995 ) : When observers attribute a basic emotion to an expresser, what facial behavior is actually present? Our question required that we begin with a reasonably large sample of occasions in which observers agree that someone (the expresser) is feeling one of the so-called basic emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness. Given such a set, we could then ask whether the expresser was displaying one of the hypothesized facial expressions identified by Ekman and Friesen(1978) .
To our knowledge, no one has obtained a usable and sufficiently large sample of such episodes from everyday life. Following Gosselin et al. (1995) , we therefore turned to drama. Still, we wanted to take another step toward a more ecological sample of material. We wanted to avoid student acting, brief vignettes, and scenes in which the actors were part of a study of faces and emotions. We therefore looked at four major Hollywood films noted for their realistic portrayal of modern life and for their highly emotional content. In the films, we identified 147 episodes in which a character was perceived as having one basic emotion. We then analyzed the facial behavior of that character.
Films are not real life, and so once again we were studying posed portrayals rather than the real thing. Nevertheless, Hollywood films have certain advantages over Gosselin et al.'s (1995) videos and huge advantages over still photographs made of amateurs who know that only their frozen face will convey the emotion (no voice, no motion, no words, no context). In a Hollywood film, in contrast, the emphasis is on realism; excellent actors use all the means at their disposal to convey their emotions to the audience, but in a realistic manner. The director shows the context in which the action takes place. Through film, observers can view scenes so intimate or emotional they are rarely witnessed in real life (and if such scenes were witnessed, they would rarely be recorded in a way that could be presented to a panel of observers). Through film, we had the services of some of the best actors, directors, camera crews, sound engineers, and other technicians at work today. We anticipated that the visual nature of the film medium might slightly exaggerate the use of facial expressions, but at least it would not underestimate their use. The four films we chose were recent enough to seem modern but long enough out of the movie theaters that the participants in our study had not seen them recently, if at all. All four had won Academy Awards for directing, acting, or for the film itself. The four films were as follows:
Dead Poets Society (1989, directed by Peter Weir, with Robin Williams). Maltin (1992) described it as "extremely well acted" (p. 287).
Kramer vs. Kramer (1979, directed by Robert Benton, with Dustin Hoffman, Meryl Streep, Jane Alexander, and Justin Henry). Maltin (1992) commented, "an intelligent, beautifully crafted, intensely moving film. . . acted to perfection by the entire cast" (p. 663).
Ordinary People (1980, directed by Robert Redford, with Donald Sutherland, Mary Tyler Moore, Judd Hirsch, and Timothy Hutton). Maltin (1992) listed it as a four-star film, calling it "superb. . . intelligent, meticulously crafted" (p. 916) and noting its Academy Awards for director, supporting actor, and as best picture of the year.
Terms of Endearment (1983, directed by James L. Brooks, with Shirley MacLaine, Debra Winger, and Jack Nicholson). Maltin (1992) commented, "Wonderful mix of humor and heartache. . . with exceptional performances by all three stars" (p. 1242).
Method
A three-stage process was used to assess the facial behavior of a character during episodes in which that character was perceived as experiencing one of the six basic emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, or sadness. In Stage 1, we obtained a preliminary list of such episodes. In Stage 2, we selected those episodes that achieved consensus on one emotion. In Stage 3, the facial behavior of the character was coded.
Stage 1
Participants. Twenty-one undergraduates of the University of British Columbia, who received course credit for their participation, each saw one of the four films. In all, 4 viewed Dead Poets Society, 5 viewed Kramer vs. Kramer, and 6 viewed the other two films.
Viewing procedure. In the top right corner of each frame, the elapsed time was placed, to the 100th of a second, in an easily visible format. The film was then shown to participants, in small groups, on a television monitor. The sound was on, and the film was shown from the beginning. Three of the films were shown to the end; because of its length, Terms of Endearment was stopped about three quarters of the way through. Participants were asked to note on a response sheet the recorded time at which any character was feeling one of six emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, or sadness. The participant also indicated which one of these emotions occurred for each time recorded, by circling that word on the response sheet. An example was given, the procedure clarified, and the film was shown. The experimenter was present throughout the session, and participants were not allowed to interact. The room was dark, and participants focused on the film. Any breach of this demeanor was politely admonished. Other than monitoring the viewers, the experimenter did not interfere after the preliminary introduction. (It might be imagined that our participants became overtly emotional while viewing especially emotional scenes. Apart from laughter during some very amusing scenes, we observed no such signs of emotion. FernandezDols, Sanchez, Carrera, and Ruiz-Belda, in press, reported experimental evidence to the same point.)
Selecting episodes. Each participant recorded, on average, 68 occurrences of an emotion. Whenever 2 or more participants agreed within 10 s in the time recorded, a potential episode was listed. All potential episodes were then examined carefully. From this list, we eliminated episodes for which no 2 participants agreed on the same emotion, episodes in which different participants were quite likely responding to different characters, episodes in which the face was hidden or absent, episodes in which multiple characters (e.g., a mob scene) made confusing just who was experiencing the emotion, and episodes that followed so closely on a previously identified episode that it might cause confusion in Stage 2. The result was a list of 157 episodes in which the face of one character was clearly visible and at least 2 participants agreed that the character was feeling the same specific emotion at a specific time.
Defining each episode. We next determined a precise temporal boundary for each episode. For most episodes, the end was denned as the point when the camera switched from the target character to something else. When the camera remained on the character well beyond the identification of the emotion, a point approximately 2 s beyond the last identification was arbitrarily selected. The beginning of the episode was then defined as the point at which the camera first turned to or focused on the target character.
Stage 2
Participants. Participants were 44 undergraduates of the University of British Columbia, who received course credit and who had not participated in Stage 1. "fen to 12 viewed each film.
Procedure. Groups of 3 to 6 participated in each session. Each group watched one of the four films, again with sound and from the beginning. Again, the experimenter was present throughout the session, and participants were not allowed to interact. The experimenter told them that they were being asked to watch a regular motion picture and to judge how some of the characters were feeling from time to time. "Every so often, I will pause the tape and ask you what emotion a particular character in the film is feeling. "*bu will use the response sheets in front of you to record your answers."
The forced-choice response sheet listing the six emotions was then explained. It was emphasized that they should choose one and only one emotion term for each episode. The experimenter then showed the film, stopping at the preselected end point for each episode, selected from Stage 1. Each time the experimenter stopped the tape, he called out the number of the trial and indicated which character was to be judged (e.g., "Episode 21. What emotion is the father feeling?").
Selecting episodes. We next sought to select a set of episodes on which there was a reasonable consensus as to which basic emotion was portrayed. Episodes were selected if at least 50% of the participants agreed on a specific emotion term (there were no cases of a perfect 50-50 split between two emotions). Ten episodes failed this criterion, leaving 147 episodes for the next stage. Table 1 lists the composition of this final set of 147 episodes and the amount of agreement as to the specific emotion. Overall, 82% of participants agreed on the selected emotion. The average episode lasted 8.9 s. (The temporal boundaries of each episode were for our purposes; the participants saw the entire film preceding the episode and were thus not limited by or even aware of these boundaries, except that they made their judgments at the end point.)
Stage 3
Procedure. All facial movements of the target character within the temporal boundaries of each episode were coded by a trained facial action coding system (FACS) coder, who had successfully completed Ekman and Friesen's (1978) FACS training program, AH upper and lower face AUs were coded; this included all AUs relevant to Ekman and Friesen's (1978 , Table 11 -1) emotion predictions. Talking (AU 50) also was coded. We omitted codes for miscellaneous head and eye movements and for certain degrees and types of eye closing (AUs 41 through 46).
Definition of expression.
An expression was defined so as to maximize the number of expressions coded and thus to maximize the likelihood of finding the predicted expressions. An expression was defined as an AU occurring alone, or as two or more AUs occurring simultaneousJy. For example, if at any time during the episode, AU 4 was visible and at a later time AU 12 was visible, then simply 2 expressions would be coded for that episode; AU 4 and AU 12. If, however, the AU 12 had begun before AU 4 ended and continued after AU 4 ended, then 3 expressions would be coded: AU 4, AU 12, and AU 4 4-12. In the modal episode, only 1 expression was found, but in some episodes as many as 5 were found. In all, 255 expressions were identified.
Coder reliability. The first 10 episodes from one randomly selected film were coded by a second trained FACS coder. Coder reliability was assessed according to Ekman and Friesen's (1978) formula; the number of exact AU agreements multiplied by 2 and divided by the sum of the number of AUs scored by the two coders. Coder reliability was 86%, which satisfied Ekman and Friesen's (1978) suggested criterion of 80%.
Results
Our procedure located 147 episodes in which a target character was consensually perceived as feeling one specific basic emotion. These episodes were of a sufficient duration (M -8,9 s) for considerable facial behavior to occur, and indeed, a frameby-frame scrutiny of the target character revealed 255 codable expressions containing a total of 477 occurrences of AUs (either alone or in patterns). We first examine how well these data matched that predicted by Ekman and Friesen (1978 , Table 11 -1), and we then provide a more descriptive analysis of the facial behavior recorded. 
Note. Each of the 147 episodes was examined for the occurrence of any of the Ekman and Friesen (1978 , Table 11 -1) predicted prototype facial expressions. Occurrence of a predicted prototype was scored as a hit; occurrence of a prototype predicted for a different emotion was scored as a miss. For example, in examining an anger episode, the occurrence of one of the predicted anger expressions would be a hit, and occurrence of a predicted fear expression would be a miss. Hits and misses were not mutually exclusive, in that an episode could contain both a hit and a miss. This occurred, in fact, four times. Each episode was coded so that it contained no more than one hit and no more than one miss. Single = number of prototypes of only a single action unit (AU). Pattern = number of prototypes of more than a single AU. For 3 of the 33 happy prototypes, the episodes had the correct AU (12), but it lacked the intensity to be in this category. However, we categorized them as prototypical in an attempt to be inclusive. An AU 12 that lacked the intensity of the happy prototype was not considered a miss for nonhappy emotion episodes. " Numbers given refer to AU codes in Ekman and Friesen's (1978) facial action coding system; see Table 5 for a brief description of the facial action corresponding to each code number.
b This pattern is shown in Figure 1 . The individual facial AUs are shown in Figure 2 .
Ekman and Friesen's Predictions
Prototype expressions. For each hypothesized basic emotion, Ekman and Friesen (1978 , Table 11 -1) provided a FACS description of its expression on the face. They did not specify just one facial expression but a set of allowable variants. We refer to all their allowable variants as prototypes. Three of the variants are single AUs (AU 12 for happiness, and either AU 9 or AU 10 for disgust). All the remaining 52 variants (recall that head and eye movements are ignored in our scoring) are patterns consisting of two or more simultaneous AUs.
Each of our 147 episodes was examined for any occurrence of any of the 55 variants. Occurrence of a prototype predicted for that episode's judged emotion was scored as a hit (whatever other facial behavior might have occurred simultaneously or at any other time during the episode; if the facial expression occurred while the actor was talking, then absence of AUs 23 or 24 [ lip movements ] or 25, 26, or 27 [ degree of mouth opening ] would not exclude the expression from being categorized as a hit). Occurrence of a prototype predicted for a different emotion was scored as a miss.
3 Occurrence of neither was scored as "no prototype." For example, in an anger episode, the occurrence of any of 30 variants of the predicted ' 'anger'' expression would be a hit, occurrence of a "fear" prototype would be a miss, and episodes with neither a hit nor a miss would be a "no prototype." It was possible to have both a hit and a miss in the same episode; this in fact occurred four times. But no more than one hit or one miss was counted per episode (e.g., during a happiness episode, a smile was counted as a hit, but two smiles did not count as two hits). The results are shown in Table 2 .
Overall, Ekman and Friesen's (1978) predictions achieved 44 hits, 21 misses, and 86 "no prototypes." The 44 hits may appear to be a success story, but closer analysis shows that success was largely limited to the happiness episodes, where 33 of the 44 hits occurred. During the 112 episodes of an emotion other than happiness, there were 11 hits and 20 misses. If we scored a "no prototype" as a nonsuccess of the Ekman and Friesen predictions, then there would be 11 successes and 104 nonsuccesses. Moreover, in 3 of these 11 hits, the episode contained both a hit and a miss. Therefore, in only 8 of the nonhappiness episodes (7%) would observation of facial behavior allow an unequivocal and correct prediction of the judged emotion; in 17 episodes (15%), the prediction would have been unequivocal and incorrect; and in the remaining 87 (78%) episodes, facial behavior would not have predicted the judged emotion.
Even though the photographs published by Ekman and his colleagues emphasize patterns, a disproportionate number of occurrences of the Ekman-Friesen prototypes observed here were actually single AUs. Table 2 therefore separates patterns from single AUs. Of the 65 prototypes seen (either as hits or misses), 21 were a single AU-either AU 10 or AU 12; the predicted AU 9 did not occur-and 44 were patterns.
To summarize, happiness differed greatly from the other emotions. In 33 of the 35 happiness episodes (97%), Ekman and Friesen's predictions were borne out; moreover, the predicted pattern (the Duchenne smile) was frequent (occurring in 74% of all happy episodes). In the 112 episodes of another emotion, in contrast, misses or nonpredicted facial behavior far exceeded predicted behavior. Only 11 occurrences of a predicted prototype were found (10% of cases).
Partial predictions. According to components theory, Ekman and Friesen's (1978) predicted patterns may occur infrequently, but parts of those patterns will be more common. In our next analysis, we examine partial successes.
Each of the 147 episodes was classified into one of four mutually exclusive categories: "predicted prototype," "partial," "different," and "no movement." An episode was classified as a predicted prototype in exactly the same manner as hits had been classified in Table 2 (at least once during the episode, an expression occurred that matched one of the Ekman and Friesen predicted variants for that emotion). An episode was classified as partial if at least once during the episode, an expression occurred that contained at least one AU from one of the variants predicted by Ekman and Friesen for that emotion but had not been classified as a predicted prototype. (In fact, 75% of the episodes classified as partial contained just one predicted AU.) An episode was classified as different if it contained facial movement (other than talking) but none of its coded AUs matched any of those listed by Ekman and Friesen for the judged emotion. Finally, an episode was classified as no movement if no facial movement (other than talking) was coded. Table 3 shows the results.
The coding of prototypes was identical to that reported in Table 2 . The coding of partials showed that many episodes not showing the full predicted expression nevertheless showed pieces of the prototypes. Indeed, 43% of all episodes were so classified. Although Ekman and Friesen (1978) did not consider the case of partial expressions, if we combine partials with predicted prototypes, 73% of all episodes were at least partial prototypes, a number significantly greater than the combined number (27% of total) of different and no movement episodes, X 2 {\,N = 147) = 15.6,p < .01. The question might be raised of whether a partial should be considered a genuine success for Ekman and Friesen's (1978) system. The problem is that whereas Ekman and Friesen's prototypes are defined in such a way that they are unique to the predicted emotion, partial patterns (mainly single AUs) are not all so defined. For example, an AU such as 5 (a raising of the upper eyelids) occurs in the prototype for half the emotions: surprise, fear, and anger. In the most extreme case, AU 26 (mouth open) occurs in at least one variant for all emotions except happiness. Therefore, in Table 3 , occurrence of AU 5 was considered partial success for three emotions, and occurrence of AU 26 was considered a partial success for five emotions, even though AU 5 or AU 26 alone would not be diagnostic of which emotion occurred. To estimate the extent of this problem, we reexamined each episode categorized as partial in Table 3 , asking whether it would have counted equally well as a partial success for some other emotion. (The requirement for "equally well" in a given episode was that an expression occurred containing a number of AUs for a nonpredicted emotion equal to or greater than the number of AUs contained in the expression found for the predicted emotion.) For example, there were 18 anger episodes classified as partial successes. Of these, 8 would have fit at least equally well for sadness if the judged emotion had been sadness. On average, 2.7 other emotions (out of a potential 5) would have fit equally well for each partial. More telling, 89% of all episodes categorized as a partial success in Table 3 would have fit equally well for at least one other emotion. So, partial successes were not as successful as they might appear.
Single action units.
To provide an analysis parallel to that of Gosselin et al. (1995) , we also examined single AUs (see Table 5 for a complete list of AUs coded and a brief description of each). Unlike Gosselin et al., however, we omitted AUs 25, 26, 27, and 50 (confounded during talking), and we added AUs 13, 14, 18, and 28, all actions observed in our sample. Like Gosselin et al., we found a large difference between happiness and nonhappiness episodes. The happiness episodes contained the predicted single AUs with a high mean probability (.84); the nonhappiness episodes contained the predicted single AUs with a low mean probability (.28 for surprise, .10 for anger, .10 Note. Freq = frequency. For all emotions except surprise, an action unit (AU) 26 alone was classed as partial, but a pattern of AU 26 with other nonprototype AUs was classed as different. For surprise, AU 26 alone was classed as partial even if other nonprototypical components were present. For 3 of the 33 happy prototypes, the episode had the correct AU (12), but it lacked the intensity to be in this category. However, we categorized them as prototypical in an attempt to be inclusive. Subtotal entries are scores calculated across the five negative emotions. Total entries are scores calculated across all six emotions. Note. No more than one occurrence of the same pattern was counted within an episode. Action unit (AU) frequencies greater than their expected value are highlighted in bold. AUs 25, 26, 27, and 50 were ignored. Other refers to all the patterns that occurred in only one episode. *p < .10. **p < .05, ***p < .01.
for sad, .09 for fear, and .03 for disgust). Nevertheless, this analysis must be interpreted with caution because it failed to take into account the base rates for the single AUs. 
Descriptive Analysis
Patterns. Across the 147 episodes, which patterns (two or more simultaneous AUs) occurred? We first set aside codes for opening the mouth (AUs 25, 26, and 27) and talking (AU 50) because, of these AUs, only AU 50 is scored during talking. So that some episodes did not contribute more than others to the analysis, we counted only the first occurrence of a particular kind of pattern in each episode. With these restrictions, we found 81 occasions in which some pattern occurred. These 81 occurred in 72 different episodes and were of 28 different kinds.
Of the 28 different kinds of patterns found, 22 occurred in only one episode; these 22 idiosyncratic patterns are grouped together in Table 4 as ' 'Other.'' The remaining 6 kinds of pattern occurred in more than one episode; these 6 are listed individually in Table 4 . Of these 6, only 2 occurred with great frequency: AU 6 + 12 (the Duchenne smile) and AU 1 + 2. These 2 patterns accounted for 50 of our 81 instances of a pattern, (Indeed, AU 1 + 2 occurred also on 9 other occasions within 7 other patterns and, therefore, contributed to 28 of our 81 occurrences-bringing the total number of patterns accounted by these 2 to 59.) The Duchenne smile thus emerged as an important, frequently seen, and genuine pattern. The pattern 1 + 2 can be questioned as a genuine pattern, however, because the same muscle, frontalis, is involved in both. Action Unit 1 is a raising of the inner part of the brow; AU 2 a raising of the outer part. In our sample, we found only 2 occasions in which AU 1 occurred without AU 2 (both occasions were the occurrence of AU 1 + 4). So, AUs 1 and 2 can occur separately and thus were distinguished in Hjortsjo's (1969) system. Nevertheless, they are anatomically joined.
In Table 4 , we also examined the relation between facial patterns and judged emotion. Because some patterns occurred more than others and some emotions were seen more than others, base rates must be taken into account. An expected frequency for each cell of Table 4 was first calculated (in the same way that it would be calculated during a chi-squared analysis). Of the 54 cells, 14 showed an observed frequency greater than expected from base rates alone; these entries are highlighted in bold. These highlighted 14 entries are candidates for future studies of the facial patterns associated with individual emotions.
The analysis described in the previous paragraph is very liberal. It fails to assess which, if any, of the 14 entries are reliably greater than what would be expected by chance association. In other words, we have yet to rule out the null hypothesis that pattern and emotion are independent To estimate whether an observed frequency exceeded the frequency expected on the null hypothesis to a statistically significant degree, we calculated the probability of obtaining at least the observed frequency in a particular cell, on the basis of its expected frequency. For example, for the happy episodes, the probability of occurrence of AU 6 + 12 is its expected frequency (12) divided by the number of happy episodes (35), yielding an estimate of .34 per episode. Using this figure, we calculated that on the null hypothesis, the probability of getting at least the observed frequency (26) was less than .01. All cells with frequencies greater than expected by chance when alpha is set at .10 have asterisks in Table 4 . Eight such entries were found, indicating which associations 4 In support of Ekman and Friesen's (1978) theory, Gosselin et al. (1995) reported that predicted AUs had a higher probability than nonpredicted AUs for a particular emotion. However, this particular analysis failed to take into account the base rate of individual AUs. For example, suppose diat in one of the emotion conditions, AU 12 is predicted to occur and AU 22 is not; if AU 12 has a higher base rate across all emotion conditions than AU 22, then the test is biased. The potential problem is easiest to see in an extreme although counterfactual case: Imagine a predicted AU that occurs with high and equal frequency in all emotion conditions and a nonpredicted AU that never occurs. In such a case, Gosselin et al.'s statistical test would appear to show that the AU with the high base rate was associated with the predicted emotion, even though both AUs are equally (non)diagnostic of the specific emotion predicted. Note. Action unit (AU) frequencies (freq) greater than their expected value (E) are highlighted in bold. The discrepancy between the total number of AUs listed here (n -228) and the overall number of coded AUs (477) is due to two factors. First, AUs 25, 26, 27, and 50 are not listed here. Second, repetitions of an AU within an emotion episode are not included here. a Included within one variant of the facial expression for this emotion, according to Ekman and Friesen (1978, are most likely to prove reliable in future research. (Two of these entries involved other patterns and thus indicate only that anger and sadness were more associated with patterns than expected by chance, but not which patterns.) Because of the experimentwise probability of error, we offer this analysis as suggestive rather than rigorous. Any hypotheses derived should be tested explicitly.
Single action units. The 147 episodes in our sample yielded 477 scorable occurrences of single AUs (ignoring whether they occurred alone or simultaneously with other action units). Ignoring codes for opening the mouth (AUs 25, 26, 27) or talking (AU 50) and ignoring repetitions of the same AU within an episode reduced this number to 227. For these 227, Table 5 lists the number of episodes in which each AU was seen. Following a useful suggestion by Ekman and Friesen (1978) , we distinguish intense AU 12s (simple smiles) from less intense ones.
We also explored the relation between single AUs and the emotion conveyed by the expresser. As in the case of patterns, some AUs occurred more than others, and some emotions were judged more than others. An expected frequency for each cell of Table 5 was therefore first calculated (in the same way that it was in the analysis above). Of the 132 cells, 34 showed an observed frequency greater than expected; these entries are highlighted in bold. On average, there were 5.8 AUs associated with each emotion, with a frequency greater than anticipated merely by the base rates of the AUs and the emotions. These highlighted 34 entries are candidates for future studies of the facial movements associated with individual emotions.
To estimate which, if any, of the 34 entries are reliably greater than what would be expected by chance association, we calculated the probability of obtaining at least the observed frequency in a particular cell, on the basis of its expected frequency. All cells with frequencies greater than that expected by chance when alpha is set at .10 have asterisks in Table 5 . Twelve such entries were found, indicating which associations are most likely to prove reliable in future research. Table 5 also marks the 28 single AU-emotion associations predicted from Ekman and Friesen's Table 11-1. Of these 28, 9 predictions were supported by the statistical analysis reported in the last paragraph. As predicted, happiness was reliably associated with AUs 6 and 12; anger with AUs 4, 5, 7, and 10; surprise with AUs 1, 2, and 5. In addition, not predicted from Ekman and Friesen, sadness was reliably associated with AUs 12 and 14.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5 reveals that not all the single AUs found greater than expected occurred as parts of patterns. In the happiness episodes, of the 33 AU 12s seen, 26 occurred in a pattern (AU 6 + 12) . For fear and disgust, AUs 1 and 2 occurred in the dubious 1 + 2 pattern. For the remaining emotions, however, single AUs dominated. In anger, AUs 4, 5, 7, and 10, and in sadness, AUs 4, 12, and 14 more often occurred alone than in a pattern. Surprise showed both these results: AUs I and 2 occurred as a pattern, but AU 5 did not.
General Discussion
Fsrn&ndez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda (1997) pointed to Eadweard Muybridge's photographs of running horses as a cautionary tale. For centuries, artists and illustrators had depicted horses running with all feet simultaneously off the ground in a symmetric pattern. To the great surprise of many, Muybridge's photographs showed that horses actually run in a complex asymmetric pattern. Centuries of observation of an animal seen in daily life had not produced the correct image.
What are the actual patterns of facial movement that occur during emotion? Greek masks, Romantic paintings, and cartoonist's manuals all show facial patterns. Similarly, Ekman and Friesen (1976) , Izard (1971) , and Matsumoto and Ekman (1988) have published still photographs of facial patterns. The existence of patterns is explicitly incorporated into Ekman's (1972) theory of facial affect programs. No more influential perspective on emotion and its communication exists in psychology today than the theory that links emotion to patterns of facial expression. Inspired by Darwin, initiated by Tbmkins, developed by Izard and Ekman, and pursued by many (Buck, 1984; Lazarus, 1991) , this theoretical and related empirical work constitutes a research program and now provides the standard account of facial expression found in the textbooks (e.g., Carlson & Hatfield, 1992; Cornelius, 1996; Lazarus, 1991) .
Given the fame and credibility afforded this theory, our results are startling. Predicted patterns (with one exception) were rare or nonexistent. Although Ekman and Friesen (1978) identified 52 different patterns for their six basic emotions, only the Duchenne smile and the brow raise (AU 1+2) occurred frequently in our sample. The Duchenne smile was reliably associated with happiness and was the single unequivocal success of the Ekman and Friesen (1978) predictions. The brow raise was the only other pattern frequently observed, but it was not uniquely or strongly associated with one emotion. When other patterns did occur, they were not necessarily associated with the predicted emotion either. Altogether, these results point to the uniqueness of the Duchenne smile and its perceived association with happiness.
Single AUs, in contrast, did occur, and some were reliably (although not typically strongly) associated with specific emotions. The strongest association was between happiness and AUs 6 and 12. The results with single AUs were encouraging to those who use components theory to think about the association of facial behavior and emotion.
Defense of the Standard Theory
Two lines of defense might be taken by advocates of the standard theory. The first is to point out that Izard's (1994) and Ekman's (1994) theories do not predict that emotions are associated with their prototypical facial patterns 100% of the time. Strictly speaking, our results therefore do not test their theories. For example, Ekman (1972) interposes display rules between the activation of the facial affect program and any observable behavior. Display rules can inhibit or exaggerate the facial behavior or substitute any other facial behavior In the absence of a theory of display rules, Ekman's model therefore allows any facial behavior whatsoever to occur as a result of any specific emotion and still count as conforming to the model. It is not clear that such a model is testable until it is complemented by a specific theory of display rules.
The second line of defense might be to emphasize the limitations of the present results. The present study and that of Gosselin et al. (1995) are of course based on very limited data and require replication in other circumstances. But however much emphasis is put on their limitations, such results serve at the very least to raise questions. For example, why are photographs of spontaneous occurrences of the predicted facial patterns so rare? Why have researchers routinely relied on posed still photographs? Despite a tremendous amount of research on facial expressions, there are, to our knowledge, no reports of the spontaneous occurrence of the predicted facial patterns, with the exception of the ubiquitous smile, during episodes of the corresponding emotion.
Further, the limitations may not be as great as they appear. We did not search all facial behavior seen in the four movies. We examined only 21.8 min (out of a total of 487 min), which is 4.5% of the viewing time of the four movies. On the other hand, these are just those moments consensually judged as showing a single basic emotion.
The major limitation was that both Gosselin et al. (1995) and the present study relied on actors performing scripts and knowing that an audience would see their performance. This fact requires several comments. First, obviously nothing that we found in this way speaks directly to the facial actions that accompany emotions in everyday life. It is certainly possible that real life is more in line with Ekman and Friesen's (1978) predictions than are Hollywood's depictions of real life. Perhaps our rather startling findings in some way depend on this simulated quality of the emotions. Perhaps more patterns of the predicted variety would appear if actual experiences of the basic emotions were studied. We hope that this possibility inspires someone clever enough to pursue it. An examination of the facial movements of infants, for example, would surely reveal several patterns (the play smile, the cry face). Nevertheless, several considerations speak against blind faith in this possibility for adults.
First, wholesale dismissal of our results on the grounds that we examined a simulated version of reality would compel those inclined toward logical consistency to even greater skepticism on all studies using posed facial expressions presented to observers under artificial circumstances. Few studies in the realm of facial expression would remain standing. The skepticism entailed by this line of argument would far outweigh any doubts created by taking our data seriously. One anonymous reviewer enthusiastically endorsed such wholesale skepticism, emphasizing that psychologists must study spontaneous facial behaviora recommendation we enthusiastically endorse.
Second, other research has shown that audiences often increase rather than decrease the amount of facial behavior (Fridlund, 1994) . The visual nature of Hollywood films would seem to suggest that, if anything, the expressiveness of the face would be exaggerated rather than minimized in films.
Third, although a greater occurrence of the predicted patterns in real life is a possibility, no evidence exists showing it to be a fact. Ekman's (1980) set of photographs of spontaneous expressions taken during his expedition to New Guinea showed many smiles, just as found here. There were also single AUs (4, 12, and 9). Only one photograph was found of an anger pattern (Plate 17), and that was much more subtle than anything portrayed by Ekman and Friesen (1976) in their posed photographs. Similarly, Ekman (1980) found but one example of a disgust pattern (Plate 16) and two of surprise (Plates 7 and 8). To our knowledge, Ekman has not published an analysis of the spontaneous facial behavior he observed in New Guinea; further, we have no independent indication of the emotional state of the person whose face was photographed.
There have been studies of spontaneous facial behavior. In the majority of such studies, no description of the actual behavior was reported (e.g., Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986) . Where actual behavior was coded, the results were even more discouraging to the standard account than ours. Whereas we found smiles and happiness co-occurring, observation of real-life circumstances suggests that happiness can occur without smiles and vice versa (Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995b; Fridlund, 1991; Jones & Raag, 1989; Kraut & Johnston, 1979; Tassinary, 1985) . A study of the facial behavior of Olympic Gold Medal winners illustrates how surprising the results of simple naturalistic observation can be: Athletes almost surely experiencing intense happiness smiled only under certain social conditions and not otherwise (Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995a) .
Finally, we challenge anyone who suspects that our results seriously distort reality to view the four films we studied. During scenes of great emotion, scrutinize the facial expressions used by Dustin Hoffman, Meryl Streep, or the other actors. Then try imagining the actor not with the facial expression actually shown but with the one predicted by Matsurnoto and Ekman (1988) , such as that seen in our Figure 1 .
Where Does the Belief in Patterns Come From?
We now turn to a paradox. The evidence associating facial patterns with emotions is very weak; the belief that facial patterns are associated with emotions is very strong. We suspect that belief in the existence of facial patterns is not based on a weighing of published evidence but, rather, on a more commonsense observation. Everyone is convinced that they regularly see these patterns associated with emotion. So, the question is, how could almost everyone believe that they regularly see these patterns if, as we suggest, the patterns are rare or nonexistent? Why do amateurs pose these patterns to convey specific emotions? If facial patterns are extremely rare and yet artists and illustrators portray them and the lay public recognizes them (at least in familiar Western cultures), we seem to have a paradox. Where do the patterns come from, if not emotion reality? Oster, Daily, and Goldenthal (1989) put this point explicitly as an argument in favor of the existence of the hypothesized patterns:
If observers from very different cultures-including isolated, preliterate cultures-see the same emotions in the same faces, we can. . . infer that this meaning is derived from the observer's experience with spontaneous expressions observed in real-life, emotion-arousing situations in their own cultures. That is, we can infer that the expressions themselves are universal, (p. 114) Oster et al. (1989) may be overly optimistic in their conclusions about the performance of isolated cultures (Russell, 1994 (Russell, , 1995 but see Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1994) , and they fail to mention that even if observers are shown a facial pattern, they may base their judgments on only a part of the pattern. Nevertheless, Oster et al. raised an interesting question.
We think that the key to this puzzle may He in the occurrence of the individual AUs. Rather than postulate that belief in patterns arises from observing them, we would like to suggest an alternative way in which such a belief could arise. Our mechanism consists of the joint action of two processes. The first process is prototype formation. Recall Posner and Keele's (1968) early work on the formation of prototypes. Shown a set of geometric patterns, each a randomly altered variant on an original pattern, participants seem to form a schema or prototype of the original. Although never seen, the original is misremembered as having been seen (for more recent discussions of prototype formation and for alternative explanations, see Estes, 1994; Nosofsky, 1992; Smith & Sloman, 1994) . A similar phenomenon might occur for facial expressions. Suppose that a child sees facial expressions that typically consist of a single AU. One day, the child sees anger associated with AU 5 (raising of the upper eyelid), another day associated with AU 4 (furrowing of the brows), another day associated with AU 7 (tightening of the lower eyelids-the Clint Eastwood look), another day associated with AU 23 (pursing of the lips), and so on. On occasion, the child sees a pair of action units randomly chosen from this same set, sometimes even a triplet. So, anger is often associated with facial action, and the child slowly forms an abstract schema or prototype that consists of a single combination of all associated single AUs. (In this scenario, we assume that the child observer infers anger mainly from situational cues; we do know that observers use situational cues to infer a specific emotion even when the facial expression seen is far from the Ekman-Friesen prototype for the judged emotion; Carroll & Russell, 1996.) The second process is human narration (Bavelas & Chovil, 1997) . Human beings mime, simulate, act out stories, and illustrate and comment on events. Children see parents', illustrators 1 , artists', cartoonists', storytellers', and actors' portrayals of anger and the other emotions. Part of our cultural heritage is a set of facial symbols (including the Greek masks of tragedy and comedy) for emotional experience. These symbols are not arbitrary but are based on the kinds of facial movements that sometimes are correlated with actual emotional experiences. Where did they come from? Imagine that you undertake to mime thinking, "feu probably would exaggerate and combine any nonverbal movements you could. You might pause, scratch your head, rub your chin, and while staring into space slowly move your hands up and down as if weighing two options. None of these actions typically occur during thinking and almost never in combination. Nevertheless, the mime does them all-because if such actions were to occur, they would surely imply thinking. Even though people almost never rub their abdomens when hungry, the mime might-because doing so draws attention to the stomach. Even if various separate AUs almost never appear on the face of an angry person simultaneously, the mime might combine all possible facial signs of anger to make the resulting gesture as easy to read as possible.
These two mechanisms could work together to produce a belief in a facial pattern for each emotion. Prototypes would guide miming and other pieces of amateur theater Mimed facial action would provide further examples for the child's formation of prototypes. So, on this account, the full prototypical patterns known as "facial expressions of emotion" exist in the world of theater and in the mind of the observer as cognitive prototypes. The standard account is more viable in amateur acting and melodrama than in the professional acting of Hollywood's best. The mundane reality of actual facial behavior that occurs during everyday emotional episodes-well, that remains largely uncharted territory.
